Not quite. To quote from the opinion:

Though the statute affords physicians discretion, it requires more than a doctor’s mere subjective belief. By requiring the doctor to exercise “reasonable medical judgment,” the Legislature determined that the medical judgment involved must meet an objective standard. Dr. Karsan asserted that she has a “good faith belief” that Ms. Cox meets the exception’s requirements. Certainly, a doctor cannot exercise “reasonable medical judgment” if she does not hold her judgment in good faith. But the statute requires that judgment be a “reasonable medical” judgment, and Dr. Karsan has not asserted that her “good faith belief” about Ms. Cox’s condition meets that standard. …

Nothing in this opinion prevents a physician from acting if, in that physician’s reasonable medical judgment, she determines that Ms. Cox has a “life-threatening physical condition” that places her “at risk of death” or “poses a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function unless the abortion is performed or induced.”

Basically, the opinion is a fairly legalistic argument that the physician didn’t use the right magic words, but that the ruling doesn’t matter because there’s no de jure requirement for court preapproval. It completely misses the point of why doctors are unwilling to perform abortions without that approval.