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2·3 months agoGood bot
In this particular case, the method of infection of the router was not disclosed. However, typically, the most common methods involve an open administration port to the internet (user interface or TR-069) or through the internal interface, in case a network host has been compromised.
They often perform brute-force password attacks, and once access is obtained, they look for typical Linux administrative tools (such as bash, etc.) and proceed to compromise the router.
So I understand that a router with custom firmware can be compromised if it has a weak password and resources to maintain the infection, or of course, a vulnerability that is exploitable.
Not following… Since this is a cybersecurity com, I assume that many of us work in this area, literally defending people and organizations from attackers and scammers. That’s why I said some of us make a living out of this in a sad way.
Sad, but some of us make a living out of this. But still sad (and true).
Of course if that was not the case we could employ our sorry minds to something more constructive.
Stop giving me your toughest battles <insert meme here>
IoCs from original research:
Hashes
267071df79927abd1e57f57106924dd8a68e1c4ed74e7b69403cdcdf6e6a453b 54/70
d6ac21a409f35a80ba9ccfe58ae1ae32883e44ecc724e4ae8289e7465ab2cf40 54/71
ad4d196b3d85d982343f32d52bffc6ebfeec7bf30553fa441fd7c3ae495075fc
13c017cb706ef869c061078048e550dba1613c0f2e8f2e409d97a1c0d9949346
b376a3a6bae73840e70b2fa3df99d881def9250b42b6b8b0458d0445ddfbc044
Domains
hanagram[.]jpthefinetreats[.]com
caduff-sa[.]chjeepcarlease[.]com
buy-new-car[.]com
carleasingguru[.]com
IP Addresses
91[.]193[.]18[.]120
Link to article.
IoCs:
IOCs Hashes (SHA-256) Email – 16e6dfd67d5049ffedb8c55bee6ad80fc0283757bc60d4f12c56675b1da5bf61
Docx – 1abf56bc5fbf84805ed0fbf28e7f986c7bb2833972793252f3e358b13b638bb1
Injected ZIP – 95898c9abce738ca53e44290f4d4aa4e8486398de3163e3482f510633d50ee6c
LNK file – d07323226c7be1a38ffd8716bc7d77bdb226b81fd6ccd493c55b2711014c0188
Final ZIP – 94499196a62341b4f1cd10f3e1ba6003d0c4db66c1eb0d1b7e66b7eb4f2b67b6 26/64
Client32.exe – 89f0c8f170fe9ea28b1056517160e92e2d7d4e8aa81f4ed696932230413a6ce1 26/73
URLs and Hostnames yourownmart[.]com/solar[.]txt
firstieragency[.]com/depbrndksokkkdkxoqnazneifidmyyjdpji[.]txt
yourownmart[.]com
firstieragency[.]com
parabmasale[.]com
tapouttv28[.]com
IP Addresses 192[.]236[.]192[.]48
173[.]252[.]167[.]50
199[.]188[.]205[.]15
46[.]105[.]141[.]54
Others Message ID contains: “sendinblue[.]com”
Return Path contains: “sender-sib[.]com”
For the IoCs, check the original research.
Normally web filters categorize IPFS gateways as p2p, and most organizations block this category.
From the text:
Now, attackers breach a user’s mobile account with stolen, brute-forced, or leaked credentials and initiate porting the victim’s number to another device on their own. They can do this by generating a QR code through the hijacked mobile account that can be used to activate a new eSIM. They then scan it with their device, essentially hijacking the number.
No need for social engineering.
Hear, hear!
Unfortunately, this is the really not only for Meta, but most of social platforms, gaming, e-commerce, not to mention gambling.
The shoemaker’s son always goes barefoot.
IOCs from the article :
Type Value Description IP 91.92.240[.]113 Magnet Goblin Infra IP 45.9.149[.]215 Magnet Goblin Infra IP 94.156.71[.]115 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://91.92.240[.]113/auth.js Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://91.92.240[.]113/login.cgi Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://91.92.240[.]113/aparche2 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://91.92.240[.]113/agent Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://45.9.149[.]215/aparche2 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://45.9.149[.]215/agent Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/lxrt Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/agent Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/instali.ps1 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/ligocert.dat Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/angel.dat Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/windows.xml Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/instal1.ps1 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/Maintenance.ps1 Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://94.156.71[.]115/baba.dat Magnet Goblin Infra URL **http://**oncloud-analytics[.]com/files/mg/elf/RT1.50.png Magnet Goblin Infra URL http://cloudflareaddons[.]com/assets/img/Image_Slider15.1.png Magnet Goblin Infra Domain mailchimp-addons[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain allsecurehosting[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain dev-clientservice[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain oncloud-analytics[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain cloudflareaddons[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain textsmsonline[.]com MiniNerbian C2 Domain proreceive[.]com MiniNerbian C2 IP 172.86.66[.]165 NerbianRAT C2 IP 45.153.240[.]73 NerbianRAT C2 SHA256 027d03679f7279a2c505f0677568972d30bc27daf43033a463fafeee0d7234f6 NerbianRAT SHA256 9cb6dc863e56316364c7c1e51f74ca991d734dacef9029337ddec5ca684c1106 NerbianRAT SHA256 9d11c3cf10b20ff5b3e541147f9a965a4e66ed863803c54d93ba8a07c4aa7e50 NerbianRAT SHA256 d3fbae7eb3d38159913c7e9f4c627149df1882b57998c8acaac5904710be2236 MiniNerbian SHA256 df91410df516e2bddfd3f6815b3b4039bf67a76f20aecabccffb152e5d6975ef MiniNerbian SHA256 99fd61ba93497214ac56d8a0e65203647a2bc383a2ca2716015b3014a7e0f84d MiniNerbian SHA256 9ff0dcce930bb690c897260a0c5aaa928955f4ffba080c580c13a32a48037cf7 MiniNerbian SHA256 3367a4c8bd2bcd0973f3cb22aa2cb3f90ce2125107f9df2935831419444d5276 MiniNerbian SHA256 f23307f1c286143b974843da20c257901cf4be372ea21d1bb5dea523a7e2785d MiniNerbian SHA256 f1e7c1fc06bf0ea40986aa20e774d6b85c526c59046c452d98e48fe1e331ee4c MiniNerbian SHA256 926aeb3fda8142a6de8bc6c26bc00e32abc603c21acd0f9b572ec0484115bb89 MiniNerbian SHA256 894ab5d563172787b052f3fea17bf7d51ca8e015b0f873a893af17f47b358efe MiniNerbian SHA256 1079e1b6e016b070ebf3e1357fa23313dcb805d3a6805088dbc3ab6d39330548 WARPWIRE SHA256 e134e053a80303d1fde769e50c2557ade0852fa827bed9199e52f67bac0d9efc WARPWIRE URL www.fernandestechnical[.]com/pub/health_check.php Compromised Server URL biondocenere[.]com/pub/health_check.php Compromised Server URL ****www.miltonhouse[.]nl/pub/opt/processor.php Compromised Server URL https://theroots[.]in/pub/media/avatar/223sam.jpg Compromised Server SHA256 7967def86776f36ab6a663850120c5c70f397dd3834f11ba7a077205d37b117f Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 9895286973617a79e2b19f2919190a6ec9afc07a9e87af3557f3d76b252292df Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 bd9edc3bf3d45e3cdf5236e8f8cd57a95ca3b41f61e4cd5c6c0404a83519058e Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 b35f11d4f54b8941d4f1c5b49101b67b563511a55351e10ad4ede17403529c16 Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 7b1d1e639d1994c6235d16a7ac583e583687660d7054a2a245dd18f24d10b675 Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 8fe1ed1e34e8758a92c8d024d73c434665a03e94e5eb972c68dd661c5e252469 Other: Tools and scripts SHA256 fa317b071da64e3ee18d82d3a6a216596f2b4bca5f4d3277a091a137d6a21c45 Other: Tools and scripts
One word for you: undies
Well, depends. If the user go to a captive portal to “authenticate” before the VPN could closes, than no. But, if the VPN can “pierce” through it (without any intervention from the AP), than yes. Anyways, If the user is willing to provide authentication data (like social media accounts, etc), nothing matters.